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Mr. Marshall

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Meeting  
Ministry  
Foreign Affairs  
Government

5. 6. 7. 8.

June 18, 1959

MEMO ANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM : Gerard C. Smith

SUBJECT: Understanding on Military Access If  
Conference Breaks Down

1. If the Foreign Ministers' meeting breaks  
hard (i.e., without an early reconvening date):

a. The summit will go out the window,  
and we will have trouble with Macmillan (and/or  
he will have trouble with the U.K. electorate)  
on this point, unless we reverse our position to date.

b. The Soviets may well turn over  
military access functions to the East Germans,  
and we shall have to execute present allied  
contingency plans (on the basis - I believe -  
of a very uncertain allied willingness to face  
the dangers that are likely to arise in the  
course of such execution).

2. If it looks as though we are headed for  
a hard break, therefore, it might be worth making  
a last minute effort to reach an agreement on  
the military access question alone, with the  
understanding that this would represent enough  
progress to justify a summit.

a. The purpose of the agreement would  
be both to tide us over the dangers that would be  
created by an East German take-over in the absence  
of any prior understanding as to access procedures  
and to enable the Heads of Government to meet free  
from any threat that our access would be jeop-

ardized if the meeting

S/P. Gerard C. Smith

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pardized if the meeting failed.

b. Duration of the agreement would be limited to the period until a broader Berlin settlement is concluded.

c. Its provisions would be very simple: that existing military access procedures should be maintained (whether or not some of those procedures are performed by Germans), and that any dispute concerning observance of the agreement should be settled by a Four Power Complaint Commission.

d. It would be clearly understood that the limited scope of the agreement was without prejudice to our position on the other issues which we and the Soviets would have to resolve in order to conclude a comprehensive agreement on Berlin.

3. Such an agreement would be to our advantage in solving the problems referred to in paragraph 1. The Soviets would probably not be interested, but there is a bare possibility that they might accept in order to get a benefit. If they turned it down, I don't see that we would have lost anything by trying.

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